

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00089 01 OF 03 021946Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01
SAJ-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 MC-02 /092 W
-----022126 117850 /67

R 021750Z MAR 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2001

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0237

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY ANKARA BY POUCH

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK BY POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0089

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC

AT ITS MARCH 2 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED IN GENERAL
TERMS THE OUTLINE TO BE USED BY UK REP (BOLLAND) IN MAKING
REGULAR AHG ORAL REPORT TO NAC MARCH 4. UK REP WILL BE
ASSITED BY LUXEMBOURG REP (WINTER) AND ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI).
UK REP WILL DRAW ON MATERIAL IN THE OUTLINE, NOT NECESSARILY
USING IT IN FULL. UNLIKE REPORTS TO NAC, THE AD HOC GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00089 01 OF 03 021946Z

DOES NOT UNDERTAKE WORD-FOR-WORD APPROVAL OF THESE OUTLINES,
WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS SPEAKING NOTES. THE TEXT OF THE OUTLINE
FOLLOWS BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE AD HOC GROUP'S LAST ORAL REPORT WAS GIVEN ON 17 DEC,

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE TENTH ROUND. THIS REPORT COVERS THE FIRST FOUR WEEKS OF THE ELEVENTH ROUND, IE THE PERIOD FROM 3 FEB TO 3 MARCH.

2. THE MAIN DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA. I SHALL COME TO THIS LATER IN MY REPORT. FIRST, I SHALL BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHERE WE STAND ON GENERAL ISSUES.

GENERAL ISSUES

3. UNDER THIS HEAD, THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERIOD MAY BE SUMMARISED AS FOLLOWS:

A) THERE WERE NO DEVELOPMENTS AS REGARDS THE MAIN SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS;

B) REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SIDE CONTINUED TO PRESS THE RIVAL MERITS OF THE WEST'S DEC 1975 AND THE EAST'S FEB 1976 PROPOSALS.

WESTERN REPS RE-EMPHASISED THAT THEY STILL AWAITED A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN OFFER, WHILE EASTERN REPS ARGUED THAT THEIR FEB 1976 PROPOSAL WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE IN THIS RESPECT.

4. APART FROM THE NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE DEC 1975 PROPOSALS, THE MAIN POINTS DEVELOPED BY WESTERN REPS DURING THE PERIOD WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A) THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE EXISTING GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES:
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00089 01 OF 03 021946Z

B) THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IN EVALUATING THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS;

C) THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES. WE STRESSED THAT CONSIDERATION OF THESE COULD NOT BE DEFERRED INDEFINITELY PENDING RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES AND WE PARTICULARLY URGED THE EAST TO JOIN, IN THE PRESENT ROUND, IN AN ACTIVE DISCUSSION OF STABILISING MEASURES;

D) WE CRITICISED THE EAST'S FEB 1976 PROPOSAL ON ESTABLISHED LINES REPEATING THAT THIS PROPOSAL IN NO WAY MODIFIED THE FINAL OUTCOME WHICH THE EAST HAD PROPOSED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IT WAS IN NO WAY COMPARABLE IN IMPORTANCE TO THE WESTERN OFFER.

5. EASTERN REPS, FOR THEIR PART, CRITICISED THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH IN FAMILIAR TERMS. IN PARTICULAR:

A) THEY COMPLAINED THAT THE WEST WAS AIMING TO CHANGE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THEY REPEATEDLY DESCRIBED THIS PRESENT RELATIONSHIP AS BEING IN GENERAL BALANCE OR AS ONE OF "APPROXIMATE EQUALITY";

B) THEY REASSERTED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A WHOLE SOVIET TANK ARMY IN EXCHANGE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUAL US SOLDIERS IN PHASE I WAS INEQUITABLE;

C) THEY CRITICISED THE REFUSAL OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES TO ACCEPT COMMITMENTS IN A FIRST AGREEMENT ON THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THEY CONTRASTED THIS WITH THE WEST'S DEMAND THAT THE EAST AGREE IN A FIRST AGREEMENT THAT PHASE II REDUCTIONS SHOULD LEAD TO A COMMON CEILING;

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00089 01 OF 03 021946Z

D) THEY REPEATED THEIR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE COMMON CEILING WHICH, THEY SAID, WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL WESTERN COUNTRIES TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES EVEN AFTER PHASE II REDUCTIONS;

E) ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES, THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE AT THE APPROPRIATE STAGE IN THE TALKS. BUT THEY ADDED THAT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE WOULD BE THE ADOPTION OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. IN THIS WAY, THEY REFUSED FOR THE TIME BEING TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF STABILISING MEASURES;

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00089 02 OF 03 022011Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2002
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AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0089

FROM US REP MBFR

F) THEY ALSO, IN PARTICULAR, RENEWED THEIR CLAIM THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AT THE DISPOSAL OF NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

IN ADDITION, EASTERN REPS REPEATED THAT THEIR NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL REMAINED ON THE TABLE. THEY ALSO REFERRED TO THE POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, THEY CLAIMED, WOULD DERIVE FROM ACCEPTANCE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S INITIATIVE ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STATING, HOWEVER, THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND FORMALLY TO INCLUDE THIS SUBJECT
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00089 02 OF 03 022011Z

IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA

6. TO TURN NOW TO THE DISCUSSION ON COUNTING RULES AND DATA WHICH HAS BEEN THE MAIN FOCUS OF INTEREST SO FAR DURING THIS ROUND.

ALTHOUGH AT THE OUTSET THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS STRESSED THEY THEY REGARDED THE DATA DISCUSSION AS SUBSIDIARY TO THE MAIN ISSUES OF REDUCTIONS, THEY SHOWED THEMSELVES PREPARED TO ANSWER THE MANY QUESTIONS PUT BY THE WEST AND, IN TURN, TO ASK QUESTIONS OF THEIR OWN ABOUT WESTERN COUNTING RULES.

7. THE FIRST OBJECTIVE OF WESTERN NEGOTIATORS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION WAS TO EXPLORE THE COUNTING RULES THE EAST HAD USED IN COMPILING THEIR DATA, IE WHICH PERSONNEL THEY HAD INCLUDED IN THE DATA, AND WHICH THEY HAD EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND

EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT FORCES. THEY CLAIMED TO HAVE ADOPTED THE WESTERN CRITERIA FOR INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. THUS THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION EASTERN REPS REPEATEDLY CLAIMED THAT THE EASTERN FIGURES INCLUDED THE ACTUAL STRENGTH OF ALL ACTIVE DUTY UNIFORMED MILITARY PERSONNEL OF EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA AND TO HAVE EXCLUDED FROM THEIR FIGURES NAVAL PERSONNEL, BORDER GUARDS, RESERVISTS, AND CIVILIANS. THEY SAID THEY HAD ALSO EXCLUDED WHAT THEY CALL 'PERSONNEL WEARING SPECIAL UNIFORM EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS SERVING IN FORMATIONS OF OTHER MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS' AND "CONSCRIPT PERSONNEL OF THE POLISH TERRITORIAL FORCES".

8. THE ONLY SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE EASTERN REPS HAVE INDICATED SO FAR IN APPLYING THESE COUNTING RULES WAS THEIR STATEMENT THAT THEY HAD ALLOCATED TO THE NAVY AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED FROM THEIR COUNT THE POLISH SEA LANDING DIVISION, WITH SOME 4700 MEN, WHICH IN WESTERN ESTIMATES HAD BEEN ALLOCATED TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00089 02 OF 03 022011Z

WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES.

9. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS CONTINUED TO PURSUE A PERSISTENT LINE OF QUESTIONING AIMED AT GETTING BEHIND THE EAST'S REPLIES AND DISCOVERING WHETHER, DESPITE FIRST APPEARANCES, THERE WERE IN FACT SOME BASIC DIFFERENCES IN THE COUNTING RULES OF THE TWO SIDES. THEY REPEATED THAT THERE WAS A LARGE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN FIGURES FOR EASTERN FORCES AND THE EASTERN FIGURES OF 10 JUNE 1976, WHICH NEEDED TO BE EXPLAINED. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE THIS COURSE OF ENQUIRY.

10. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE EAST'S PRESENT POSITION AND SEVERAL ARGUMENTS THEY HAVE ADVANCED IN THE PAST, THE FORCE OF WHICH WAS IMPLICITLY TO RECOGNISE THE EXISTENCE OF A MANPOWER DISPARITY IN THEIR FAVOUR. FOR EXAMPLE, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) THE POSITION REPEATEDLY TAKEN BY EASTERN REPS IN THE TWO YEARS FOLLOWING THE PRESENTATION OF WESTERN DATA IN 1973 THAT AN EXCHANGE OF DATA WAS NOT NECESSARY SINCE EACH SIDE HAD A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FORCES OF THE OTHER;

B) REPEATED EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD LEAD TO A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA;

C) IF THE EAST REALLY BELIEVED ALL ALONG THAT MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA WAS ROUGHLY EQUAL ON BOTH SIDES, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF THE EARLIER EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF EASTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXCLUDED

FROM EASTERN FORCE TOTALS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY PERFORM
FUNCTIONS WHICH IN THE WEST ARE PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS.

11. FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN REPS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE
DATA THE WEST HAD TABLED. THEIR DETAILED QUESTIONS HAVE AS YET
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00089 02 OF 03 022011Z

PRESENTED LITTLE DIFFICULTY, BUT THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY BELIEVED
THAT THE WEST HAD DELIBERATELY INFLATED THEIR DATA FOR WARSAW
PACT FORCES WHILE TABLING WESTERN MANPOWER FIGURES THAT WERE
TOO LOW.

AT THE INFORMAL MEETING ON 1 MARCH, EASTERN REPS SUGGESTED THAT
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOW EXAMINE THE SEPARATE NUMERICAL STRENGTH
IN THE AREA OF EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE EAST SAID
THEY WERE READY FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00089 03 OF 03 022035Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0089

FROM US REP MBFR

FURTHER PROSPECTS

12. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE ISSUE OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA WILL REMAIN THE CENTRE OF ATTENTION THROUGHOUT THIS ROUND. HOWEVER, THE BLANKET ASSERTION BY EASTERN REPS THAT THEY HAVE ADOPTED IN TOTO WESTERN RULES FOR INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS AND THAT THEY HAVE, ON THIS BASIS, INCLUDED ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNT, PRESENTS WESTERN NEGOTIATORS WITH A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. JUDGING BY THE EXPERIENCE SO FAR IN THIS ROUND, IT SEEMS LESS LIKELY
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00089 03 OF 03 022035Z

THAT, THROUGH FURTHER CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES ALONE, IN PARTICULAR OF THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WHICH THE EAST HAVE USED, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS WILL BE ABLE TO BRING THE EAST TO AN ADMISSION THAT THEY HAVE OMITTED SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF EASTERN PERSONNEL FROM THEIR FIGURES.

13. NEVERTHELESS, THE AD HOC GROUP TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROBE THE EASTERN POSITION AND TO QUESTION THE ACCURACY OF THEIR CLAIMS TO HAVE INCLUDED ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL ON THE EASTERN SIDE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH WE STILL WISH TO ASK THE EAST AND WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THEIR ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS ON RECORD.

14. MEANWHILE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN ASSESSMENT OF MANPOWER DISPARITIES IS UNCHANGED AND THAT THE EASTERN FIGURES TABLED ON 10 JUNE 1976 ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH WESTERN ASSESSMENTS. WE SHALL ALSO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE EAST TO EXPLAIN TO US THE REASONS FOR THE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN LINES OF ARGUMENT WHICH THEY USED FOR THE FIRST TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR ASSERTION NOW THAT THERE EXISTS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES.

15. THE AD HOC GROUP, HOWEVER, NOW CONSIDER THAT WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TRY TO OPEN A COMPLEMENTARY LINE OF ENQUIRY WHICH SHOULD ENABLE US MORE EFFECTIVELY TO CONTINUE THE EXAMINATION OF EASTERN COUNTING RULES AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE WAY IN WHICH THESE RULES HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE GROUP BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD FOCUS THIS LINE OF ENQUIRY ON THE LARGEST EASTERN FORCE COMPONENT, THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN BRINGING THE EAST TO TABLE ITS SUB-TOTAL FOR SOVIET FORCES,

THE WEST MUST BE READY IN RETURN TO PUT DOWN THEIR OWN
FIGURES FOR US FORCES IN THE AREA.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00089 03 OF 03 022035Z

16. THE AD HOC GROUP, AT ITS LAST MEETING ON 2 MARCH, THEREFORE
REQUESTED AUTHORISATION FROM THE COUNCIL TO RELEASE FIGURES
FOR US FORCES. THIS REQUEST WAS CONTAINED IN THE AD HOC GROUP
CHAIRMAN'S TELEGRAM OF THAT DATE.

17. I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE TWO POINTS IN THIS CONNECTION.
FIRST WE BELIEVE THAT, IF THE COUNCIL AGREES THAT WE SHOULD
TABLE FIGURES FOR US FORCES, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE
CLEAR AND PRECISE DISCLAIMERS ON TWO IMPORTANT POINTS, NAMELY:

A) THAT THE TABLING OF SUB-TOTALS WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
THE OVERALL NEGOTIATING POSITION OF EITHER SIDE; AND

B) THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON DATA FOR COMPUTING
REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, THE TABLING OF THESE FIGURES WAS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SPECIFIC DATA WHICH WOULD FORM THE
BASIS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

18. SECOND, WE HOPE THAT THIS AUTHORISATION CAN BE GIVEN QUICKLY,
SO THAT THE AD HOC GROUP CAN HAVE DATA ON US MILITARY MANPOWER
AVAILABLE BY 14 MARCH OR EARLIER, FOR USE IN THE INFORMAL MEETING
ON 15 MARCH. THIS IS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO HAVE TIME FOR AN
EFFECTIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST BEFORE THE END OF THE
PRESENT ROUND, ON OR ABOUT 6 APRIL. END TEXT.RESOR

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Message Attributes

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